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Sub-Saharan-Africa is considered the fastest-growing oil-producing region worldwide. 
Production has risen by 36 percent in the past ten years (as against 16 percent 
worldwide). Within 2005 alone, the revenue of the eight largest oil countries of sub-
Saharan Africa will be about US$35 billion. The oil revenues can give rise to a rent-
seeking mentality. Political decision-makers may focus on distributing the income on the 
basis of private interests and not so much on putting it to use for productive development 
purposes. This paper reviews ways the African oil boom can be used for sustainable 






L’Afrique sub-saharienne est la région du monde pour laquelle la croissance de la 
production pétrolière est la plus élevée. La production a augmenté de 36 pourcent au 
cours des dix dernières années (comparé à 16 pour cent dans le reste du monde). En 2005, 
les seuls revenus des huit principaux producteurs de pétrole en Afrique subsaharienne 
auraient avoisiné 35 milliards de dollars. Les revenus pétroliers peuvent donner lieu à un 
esprit de recherche de rentes. Les dirigeants politiques de ces pays peuvent se concentrer 
sur  la distribution des revenus en fonction de leurs intérêts privés plutôt que par le 
développement effectif de leur pays. Cet article passe en revue les façons dont les 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
The rapid growth in the oil-exporting countries in the Gulf of Guinea would allow these 
countries to finance large portions of their development budgets themselves. According 
to calculations by Warner (2005), the major oil countries of the region will reap a 
combined financing surplus, over and above their own Millennium Development Goal 
(MDG) investment needs and recurrent public expenditure, of US$22 billion in 2006, 
increasing to an annual US$35 billion by 2015. This amount is equivalent to about 50 
percent of the calculated MDG financing gap. Yet, excluding the benefits to small 
powerful elites, resource booms on the African continent have generally not contributed 
to sustainable development.   
 
The challenge of making greater use of the growing self-financing capacity of sub-
Saharan African countries implies, firstly, a need for building the requisite technical 
expertise for responsible management of cash flows that rise rapidly within short periods, 
and, secondly, a need for responding to the government's radically changing financial 
situation by commensurate enhancement of overall political accountability. This means 
that institutional mechanisms must be put in place or enhanced which ensure that 
authority over the control and utilization of resources is exerted on the basis of mandatory 
democratic accountability and with a view to attaining goals that enjoy democratic 
legitimacy. What is ultimately decisive in determining whether oil-based development 
progress succeeds or fails, turns out to be a curse or a blessing, is whether the principles 
of good governance are respected throughout government and society. 
 
Furthermore, in view of the financing gap to achieve the MDGs in the non-oil producing 
countries, economic and political reasons dictate that ways should be found of using the  
African oil boom for sustainable development across of the continent, benefiting societies 
at large in both oil exporting and oil importing countries. This paper reviews ways the 
African oil boom can be used for sustainable development of the continent. It is 
structured into 5 sections. Following this introduction, the next section provides some 
background on the oil production in selected African countries. Section 3 reviews the key 
implications of vast natural resource reserves. The fourth section makes suggestions on 
how development cooperation can put rentier income resulting from the oil boom to use, 
before the last section provides some conclusions and recommendations. 
 
 
Chapter II: Background 
 
The old rule of thumb that 20 percent of humankind in Europe, North America and Japan 
are using more than 80 percent of all extracted resources is no longer valid. A structural 
change has occurred: China, India and others have been added to the bill, which means 
that more than half of the global population now forms the substantial part of the demand 
for resources. In the long term, this will result in significant structural changes not only in 
the economies of oil-importing countries but also in oil-exporting countries.  
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Largely due to the increase in world demand, the price for a barrel of crude oil rose from 
US$18 in December 2001 to more than US$65 in September 2005. Assuming that 
demand for oil will continue to rise, oil prices are likely to continue to rise in the next few 
years. Given the importance oil plays in many of the African oil producing countries, this 
will have large impacts on revenues of these countries. It is estimated that in 2005 alone, 
the revenue of the eight largest oil countries of sub-Saharan Africa
1 was about US$35 
billion or about 24 percent in terms of GDP. For Angola, a ten-dollar increase in oil 
prices per barrel is equivalent to a 30 percent increase in GDP; see World Bank (2005). 
 
The largest oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa is Nigeria, with an estimated production 
volume of 2.7 million barrel/day. This makes it the world's sixth largest producer. 
Production is expected to rise to 4 million barrel/day by 2010. Projections suggest that 
national oil revenues will be at least 30 percent higher in 2008 than they were in 2005 
(estimated at US$22 billion), even after allowing for a downturn in world prices. 
Notwithstanding its wealth of oil reserves, Nigeria is forced to import about 70 percent of 
its oil products. The significance of Nigeria as an oil producer is further put into 
perspective if one looks at per capita oil production figures. With its population of 124 
million, the country only ranks 37th in a 56-country list, far behind Equatorial Guinea 
(6th), Gabon (13th), Rep. of Congo (20th) and Angola (21st); see Myers (2005) for 
details. 
 
The second largest oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa is Angola, which produces 1.09 
million barrel/day. Its production is expected to rise to 2.5 million barrel by 2008. Just 
like in Nigeria, oil accounts for a large proportion of the country's exports. According to 
the Angolan National Bank, the country exported oil and oil derivatives valued at US$5.8 
billion in 2001, which is equivalent to almost 90 percent of Angola's exports. 
 
Very recently, Equatorial Guinea joined the group of oil-exporting countries, after large 
oil reserves were discovered in the early nineties. Between 1996 and 2002, production 
rose from 20,000 barrel/day to 265,000 barrel/day. As a consequence, vast foreign 
investment, particularly from the United States, flowed into the country. It even saw the 
establishment of a direct flight between its capital (Malabo) and Houston. The oil boom 
has resulted in a tremendous increase in this small country's GDP. In 1997 alone, it rose 
by 93 percent, and average annual growth between 1998 and 2002 was a respectable 30 
percent. Government revenue grew by more than 1,200 percent between 1994 and 2000. 
 
The oil production of the Republic of Congo has quadrupled over the past decades, from 
65,000 barrel/day in 1980 to an average of 285,000 in 2005. The majority of Congolese 
crude production is located offshore and is heavily reliant on foreign personnel and 
technology. Elf-Congo, Total S.A. (France) is the leading oil producer and foreign 
investor in Congo, producing approximately two-thirds of all Congolese oil output. 
Because the Congolese Government is frequently accused of misusing oil revenues, the 
IMF has urged the country to enforce transparency and improve public finance. 
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Gabon is Sub- Saharan Africa’s fifth largest producer of crude oil and has proven oil 
reserves of 2.5 billion barrels. Contrasted with Gabon’s 1997 peak of 371,000 barrel/day, 
2005 oil production has declined 37 percent. This coming post-petroleum period will 
present a major economic challenge for Gabon, because the country has largely failed to 
use its abundant oil revenues to diversify into other forms of activity.  
 
Oil production was non-existent in landlocked Chad prior to 2003, but with the 
completion of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline in July 2003, the country began producing 
oil. Since then, Chad’s production levels have climbed steadily. Cameroon’s production 
has fallen over the same period. In 2005, Chad and Cameroon were easily able to meet 
their total combined oil demand of 25,000 barrel/day from domestic production.  
 
Sao Tomé and Principé’s oil sector and its overall national governing system operate very 
much in the shadow of Nigerian influence. It is unknown how much offshore oil wealth 
Sao Tomé and Principé possesses: estimates vary between 4 and 10 billion barrels. 
Regardless of what the actual level turns out to be, the country will remain a coir target of 





































Nigeria 124.0  471  1963  7.1  2,083 2,719 3,729 40  70  92 
Angola 13.6  1015  1956  24.0  740  1,098 2,549 54  85  89 
Equatorial Guinea  0.5  6026  1992  197.3  195  400  653    82  77 
Sudan  33.6 529 1992  2.7  230  310        
Rep. of Congo  3.7  957  1957  24.7  273  285  314  39  68  92 
Gabon 1.3  4566  1961  73.5  259  250  100  41  64  81 
Chad  8.6  307  2004    0 230 80      0 
Cameroon 16.0  862  1978  1.6  107  84  66      43 
DR Congo  52.8  108      24  30  30       
Côte d'Ivoire  16.6  845    1.2  12  43  83      13 
Sao Tome and Principe  0.2  370  2005    0  0  150      0 
 
Sources: African Development Bank and Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2005), Appendix Table 1 for data on Population and 
GDP per capita; Basedau (2005) for Beginning of oil production; Economist Intelligence Unit, 
Country Profiles for Barrel of oil per capita; KfW Bankengruppe (2004) for Oil production and 
Share of oil production.  
 
 
In 1992, Sudan began exporting crude oil. At present, Sudan’s oil sector produces 
310.000 barrels/day, with the majority coming from the Muglad basin fields in southern 
Sudan. Increased future production will be driven by exploration, which is dependent on 
the progress of the peace process and an increase in operator safety. Without exploration, 
production will decline rapidly after 2007; or if there is successful exploration and   4 
 
 
discoveries are followed by significant capital investments, production could plateau at 
approximately 450,000 b/d for the next 15 years.
2 As the largest source of revenue, oil is 
the decisive factor in the implementation of the comprehensive peace accord, signed in 
2005.  
 
Overall, oil production in the Gulf of Guinea has risen by 36 percent in the past ten years. 
By contrast, it has risen by an average of 16 percent in the rest of the world. In total, the 
region produces 4 percent of all oil worldwide. It is expected that this share will rise to 
5.9 percent by 2007. According to estimates (see Goldwyn and Morrison, 2004), the 
region's total oil deposits amount to 7.4 percent of global reserves. The significance of 
the region will continue to grow once the existing gas deposits, which are large as well, 
are no longer treated as a secondary product and flared as is common practice now, but 
rather put to commercial use in a targeted way. 
 
West Africa is considered to be the fastest-growing oil-producing region worldwide. In 
total, it is expected that some US$50 billion in investments will flow to Africa's oil fields 
over the next ten years – the largest investment in the continent's history. Africa’s crude 
oil deposits are of particular importance for Europe and the United States due to their 
location and quality. First, the largest oil reserves (24 billion barrel) are to be found 
offshore, that is, outside the immediate reach of various conflicting parties. Second, most 
of the oil is located on the West African coast of the Atlantic, that is, directly across from 
the U.S. East Coast. Third, African oil meets high purity standards thanks to its low 
sulfur content. 
 
An unmistakable indication of the oil boom that must be expected in the coming years is 
the growing number of companies that are active in the region. While in the past it was 
three large companies that controlled the sector, namely, Shell, Total (Fina-Elf), and 
Chevron, which still accounted for some 75 percent of production in 1999; additional 
players have entered the market more recently, particularly a number of Asian companies 
such as Petronas (Malaysia), ONGC Videsh (India), and Chinese National Oil Company. 
The appearance of these new "partners" in traditional developing countries is paralleled 
by the respective governments' increasingly shedding their previous ties with donors. A 
completely new balance of power is emerging, especially as a result of China's 
investment policy, which is based primarily on national interest. Tull (2005) concludes, 
among other things, that Beijing has become a trading partner for Africa that presents an 
alternative to Western countries. However, Tull also notes that China's vehement defense 
of the principle of national sovereignty is a factor of political significance which helps to 
broaden the scope for action available to authoritarian regimes. He says that this is of 
central importance for future cooperation with developing countries, as the premises of 
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Chapter III: Implications of Vast Natural Resource Reserves 
 
Vast natural resource reserves have many implications. They affect not only 
socioeconomic and political developments in the countries that own them, but also have 
implications for the countries that are dependent on these natural resources. They usually 
also have considerable environmental implications. While natural resource reserves (oil 
and other mineral resources) constitute a potential blessing for the country that owns 
them, they turn out to be a curse in most cases. This chapter first summarizes the main 
elements of the so-called resource curse, looks then at the actual experiences of the 
African oil exporters, and closes with some positive examples.  
 
III.1.   Resource Curse 
The resource curse, which is also referred to as the paradox of plenty, is not new. Some 
of the seminal contributions have been van Wijnbergen (1984) and Sachs and Warner 
(1995). While the early literature concentrated mainly on economic implications 
(especially the impact of natural resources on economic growth and the exchange rate), 
the more recent contributions have centered on the relationship of natural resources and 
civil conflict (see for example Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) and the relationship between 
natural resources and political institutions (see for example Mehlum, Moene and Torvik, 
2006). Based on the large resource curse literature, the list of negative effects of natural 
resource reserves is long, but involves mainly the following eight problem areas: 
•  trickle-down effect fails to materialize (absence of downstream sector); 
•  agricultural sector is neglected, leading to an impoverishment of the rural 
population; 
•  low tax ratios and high consumption expenditures (typically on imported goods) 
reinforce inflationary tendencies; 
•  displacement/disenfranchisement of indigenous people, conflicts over land use 
rights, and environmental degradation; 
•  strong causal links between abundance of resources and violent conflict, including 
the encouragement of separatist movements (Nigeria: Biafra, Angola: Cabinda); 
•  currency overvaluation and Dutch disease effects; 
•  strong tendency towards corruption; and 
•  diminishing willingness of governments to pursue reforms. 
 
Some of the dominant explanations that have been provided for some of these negative 
effects are that the enormous revenue flow renders the establishment of a functioning tax 
system obsolete. As a consequence, the general public and civil society have rather little 
interest in the way these revenues, to which they do not contribute, are used. Pertinent 
checks and balances remain underdeveloped, or the government is able to undermine 
them. With regard to expenditure, no use is made of openings for diversifying the 
economy, enhancing infrastructure or expanding education systems. There is virtually no 
transfer of knowledge to local enterprises, and only minimal employment in the domestic 
labor market is created. At the same time, the booming oil revenues give rise to a rent-
seeking mentality on the part of governing elites that is extremely detrimental for the 
country's development. Governing elites enjoy ownership and/or control of oil reserves 
without having to pay for them. The resulting revenue that accrues to them fosters   6 
 
 
corruption and cronyism and strengthens authoritarian regimes. The goal of these elites is 
no longer to make productive use of oil revenue but to redistribute it to their greatest 
possible benefit and to stabilize their own power.  
 
III.2.   Experiences of African Oil Exporters 
The experiences of African oil exporters has been that hardly any improvements have 
materialized for the people of the countries concerned, neither in economic and social nor 
in political terms. In five of the nine oil-producing countries examined (see Table 2), 
average life expectancy is below fifty years, and all nine countries are well in the bottom 
third of the UNDP’s Human Development Index. Oil revenue in Africa corrodes 
government institutions and threatens democracy. The Freedom House indicator of civil 
and political liberties is accordingly poor in all countries examined (see Table 2).  
 
One partial explanation for these negative political developments is related to the fact that 
the character of African oil production continues to be that of a colonial-style exclave 
economy, geared towards the needs of the world market rather than the needs of 
sustainable development. Most of the negative economic implications are summarized by 
so-called Dutch disease effects: the large volume of oil exports and their swift growth are 
causing an overvaluation of the national currency, while simultaneously imports surge, 
resulting in major declines in production and export capacity in other industries. 
 
In Nigeria, which has reaped an estimated US$600 billion in oil revenue since 1960, 
70 percent of the people live on less than a dollar a day. As Global Witness (2004, p. 4) 
states: “In Angola, new evidence from IMF documents and elsewhere confirm previous 
allegations made by Global Witness that over US$1 billion per year of the country’s oil 
revenues – about a quarter of the state’s yearly income – has gone unaccounted for since 
1996.” Global Witness (2004) also points out that the Democratic Republic of Congo has 
been treated like a colony by the French state oil company Elf Aquitaine (now Total). 
The government is bought, payment flows from oil production are not published, and 
none of the profits reach the government budget. 
 
Gabon, one of the most long-standing oil producers in the region, reached the peak of its 
production in 1996, 365,000 barrel/day. Simultaneously, it had the highest per capita 
consumption of champagne worldwide in that year. Now oil production stands at 250,000 
barrel/day and is expected to drop to approx. 100,000 barrel/day in 2012. This decline of 
production has been paralleled by a dramatic fall in GNP because the country failed to 
diversify its production structure and make its economy independent from oil. In fact, 
agricultural production has been almost completely abandoned over the years, with only 
one percent of the area still being under cultivation, so that the country is almost 
completely dependent on imports. As Yates (2005, p. 187) has pointed out, "the 
champagne days are over, and they must learn how to earn money, not just spend it."  
 
In view of this rather discouraging experience, many ask whether abundant oil reserves 
are suited as a tool for poverty reduction at all and whether they might not, on the 
contrary, further worsen the situation. The debate focuses particularly on the World 
Bank, including IFC and MIGA, which in the period since the beginning of the nineties   7 
 
 
alone has made available some US$2.75 billion in credits and guarantees for relevant 
projects in Africa, without any clear resultant development progress being evident in the 
countries concerned. For example, Pegg (2003, p. 25) concludes that "[T]he Bank has 
produced little concrete evidence to demonstrate that its support for extractive sectors has 
actually reduced poverty and achieved positive development outcomes in these 
countries." 
 









1997-2003  ( 
percent) 
Life expec-










(out of 145) 
Freedom House 
Index   
Country 
     PR  CL  Status 
Nigeria  3.7  2.7  51.3  158 144 4  4  PF 
Angola  6.0  2.9  40.2  160 133 6  5  NF 
Equatorial  Guinea  33.5 2.7  49.2 121    7  6  NF 
Gabon 0.4  2.3  57.4  123  74  5  4  PF 
Cameroon  4.6  2.2  45.1  148 129 6  6  NF 
Rep. of Congo  2.5  2.9  48.9  142  114  5  4  PF 
Sudan  7.5  2.3  55.6  141 122 7  7  NF 
Sao Tome and Principe  3.0  2.6  70.4  126    2  2  F 
Chad  6.5  3.1  45.4  173 142 6  5  NF 
 
Sources:  African Economic Outlook 2005/2006 (Average annual GDP growth, 1997-2003; 
Average population growth 1997-20023, and Life expectancy at birth, 2004); Human 
Development Report 2005 (Human Development Index 2003); and Global Corruption Report 
2005 (Corruption Index 2004 and Freedom House Index).  
Notes: "PR” stands for “Political Rights"; "CL" stands for "Civil Liberties"; and "Status" is the 
Freedom Status (where "F", "PF", and "NF", respectively, stand for "Free", "Partly Free", and 
"Not Free"); Political Rights and Civil Liberties are measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one 
representing the highest degree of freedom and seven the lowest. 
 
 
III.3. Positive  Examples 
The positive examples of Norway, the United Kingdom and a number of Gulf states are 
evidence that abundant oil resources do not necessarily constitute a natural and inevitable 
evil but that, on the contrary, this negative phenomenon is homemade, and can definitely 
be changed as it is the result of egotistical action on the part of a small elite that is subject 
to insufficient checks.  
 
Another example of a functioning resource monitoring mechanism that is frequently cited 
is the Kimberley Process created in 2002 for the diamond sector. The related certification 
process has succeeded in all but draining the market for what are called “blood 
diamonds”. However, Paes (2005) notes that the market situation for diamonds differs 
dramatically from that for crude oil as diamonds lack the strategic significance of oil. 
They are mainly marketed to individuals, who are potentially capable of organizing 
consumer boycotts as 70 percent of all diamonds are marketed by a single company (De 





Chapter IV: How Can Development Cooperation Put Rentier Income to 
Use? 
 
In view of the scarcity of donor funding mentioned above, the MDG funding gap, the 
income boom in oil-producing countries and the seemingly anti-development effects of 
rentier income, development policy is faced with the challenge of preventing damage to 
the economies concerned and developing a way of using increased rentier income that is 
conducive to development. The relevant levels for action are not only the 
national/bilateral level but also, given the global scope of action of the parties involved, 
the international/multilateral arena. This chapter therefore reviews the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), the Publish What You Pay (PWYP) campaign, 
the Publish What You Earn (PWYE) principle, and the experiences of national and 
international oil funds. 
 
IV.1.   The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
The EITI was originally an initiative of British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who presented 
it at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. Among 
others, the EITI received support at the 2003 G8 Summit in Evian, at which a resolution 
on corruption control and enhanced transparency was adopted. One essential 
characteristic of the EITI is that government’s membership is voluntary. This sets the 
EITI apart from the "Publish What You Pay" NGO campaign. However, the principle of 
voluntary membership means that the principles are not being implemented precisely in 
those countries where this would be most urgent, as is evident from the situation in 
Angola and the Republic of Congo. So far, 20 resource-exporting countries have made a 
commitment to participate in the EITI, including 12 African countries. Of the latter 
group, the Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Nigeria and Sao Tome & Principe have 
announced specific actions they will take. However, very little real progress has been 
made so far apart from declamatory acts.  
 
Both the World Bank and the IMF have publicly recognized the importance of the EITI 
process and have addressed its implementation in their own internal operational policies. 
For instance, the IMF (2005) has produced a Resource Revenue Transparency Guide, 
while a World Bank (2003) Operation Evaluation Department (OED) report on 
Extractive Industries and Sustainable Development calls on the Bank to "pursue country- 
and industry-wide disclosure of government revenues from extractive industries (EI) and 
related contractual arrangements [...]. The Bank should work toward and support 
disclosure of EI revenues and their use in resource-rich countries." [Note: We will need 
the exact page numbers if using quotations.] The World Bank responded to this 
evaluation by setting up an Extractive Industries Advisory Group. The World Bank has 
also declared its intention to only support investment in the extractive industry sector 
from now on if the transparency of revenues has been ensured in line with the terms of 
EITI. In addition, wherever the economic situation allows such an approach, government 
cooperation with the EITI should explicitly be made a mandatory integral element of the 
PRSP process. Furthermore, a World Bank-led Multi-Donor EITI Trust Fund has been   9 
 
 
established, to which the three main contributions came from Germany (€500,000), 
Norway (£60,000), and the United Kingdom (£1 million).  The UN Millennium Project 
(2005) report also regards the EITI as a contribution towards conflict prevention in 
resource-dependent countries.  
 
However, the decisive breakthrough towards more development-oriented resource 
management cannot be brought about by an increased range of persuasive measures in 
the good governance sphere alone. Ultimately, one crucial factor determining the conduct 
of African oil elites is the standards and regulations which oil-importing countries define 
for themselves and for the oil companies situated in their territory (transparency 
guidelines for companies listed on the stock market, monitoring of capital transfers, bank 
secrecy, foreign trade guarantees, etc.). As long as there are no internationally valid and 
internationally applied regulations, each individual international oil consortium that 
would be willing to join one of the initiatives would be faced with cut-throat competition 
based on worst practice. 
 
To that end, a further supportive measure would be needed, namely, an International 
Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) as demanded by Global Witness (2005). A UN 
Resolution to that effect could lend added legitimacy to the process. If the initiative 
enjoys no such legitimacy and has no generally binding character, there is a risk that 
voluntary disclosure of relevant information may create a "risk of producing an 'unlevel 
playing field' in data supply, which could be manipulated for the advantage, and possible 
disadvantage, of those choosing to make such voluntary disclosure" (see Global Witness, 
2005, p. 6). 
 
IV.2.  Publish What You Pay (PWYP) 
The Publish What You Pay (PWYP) campaign was founded by Global Witness, CAFOD, 
Oxfam, Save the Children UK, Transparency International UK and George Soros 
(Chairman of the Open Society Institute). It preceded the EITI and is supported by an 
international coalition of over 280 NGOs aiming to increase revenue transparency in the 
extractive industries. It goes beyond the EITI approach in that it also pursues the goal of 
making it binding for all oil companies listed on stock markets to disclose all information 
about payments (taxes, fees, royalties and other transactions) made to governments 
and/or public institutions with regard to all products in every country in which they 
operate. 
 
IV.3.   Publish What You Earn (PWYE) 
Capacity for greater transparency in the oil sector is not only a political issue but also a 
technical one. Highly complex arrangements, be they in the form of concessions or of 
contracts between governments, national energy agencies, public extraction companies, 
etc., on the one hand and international extraction consortia on the other, often make it 
extremely difficult to distinguish between payments from lease revenues, mining 
royalties, bonuses, taxes, etc., and to list them properly. This is true, in particular, if the 
government in question benefits from oil proceeds not exclusively based on payment 
flows but owns part of the oil production itself and markets it independently (as is the 
case with production sharing agreements). In such cases, it is not sufficient that   10 
 
 
enterprises implement the Publish What You Pay principle. Rather, in the interest of 
comprehensive transparency, this must be complemented by the Publish What You Earn 
principle for governments. This means that unlike with EITI and PWYP, all resource-
based revenues must be disclosed on a comprehensive scale. 
 
Another oil-related income source that must be disclosed is the government's commercial 
borrowing backed by future oil revenue. This form of financing is a popular means of all 
cleptocratic elites to get hold of financial resources within the period of their being in 
government., For instance, the Angolan government's share in oil production over the 
next three to five years has largely been tied up for interest payments on past borrowings. 
Applying the PWYP principle in such a constellation would mean that the lending banks 
would have to disclose payments in those cases where oil-backed contracts are 
concerned. Simultaneously, they would need to require the borrower, in this case, the oil-
exporting country, to disclose the way in which the funds from the loans are used. 
 
IV.4.   Establishment of Oil Funds 
In the past, there have been a variety of initiatives, especially in the area of national 
funds, with the goal of remedying time lags or regional disparity caused by highly 
volatile revenue. One reference model of such oil revenue management for the benefit of 
the people can be found in Norway, where the net proceeds of global oil sales have been 
channeled to the government oil fund since 1990. This has prevented the economy from 
being flooded with and destabilized by foreign exchange from oil revenue. 
Simultaneously, Norway’s approach ensures reliable funding for the country's old-age 
pension and health system. Other examples of national mechanisms outside of Africa 
include the Alaska Oil Trust and the Iraqi National Oil Trust.  
 
In the African context, the Mineral Fund in Ghana and the fund for future generations in 
Equatorial Guinea were set up as a result of national initiatives, though the little 
experience that has been gained with these funds so far has mostly been unsatisfactory.
3 
Regardless of the significant problems the Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and 
Pipeline Project pipeline project currently experiences, its approach and general structure 
should be regarded as a useful pilot effort to ensure that benefits from current resource 
extractions are properly shared.  The project implied to connect the Doba oil fields in 
southern Chad with an offshore oil-loading facility near the Atlantic port of Kribi, 
Cameroon, by means of a 1,070 km pipeline. According to Africa Live, Chad and 
Cameroon are expected to receive an annual US$2 billion and US$500 million, 
respectively, in revenue over the next 25 years from the pipeline. The pipeline was 
financed by a consortium consisting of the US oil companies ExxonMobil and Chevron 
and the Malaysian Petronas corporation, though the governments of Chad and Cameroon 
as well as the World Bank were also involved. The World Bank has shouldered 3 percent 
of the US$3.7 billion investment, after the adoption of a comprehensive environmental 
impact assessment and the adoption of a law on the use of oil revenue in Chad. 
According to this law, 10 percent of the revenues were to be transferred to a fund for 
future generations. Of the remaining 90 percent, 80 percent were supposed to be used for 
                                                 
3 The KfW Bankengruppe (2004) characterized the situation by too little budgetary discipline, insufficient 
payments into the funds, funds being used as a gravy train by those controlling the money, etc.   11 
 
 
spending in health, education, rural development and infrastructure sectors. Another 
outcome of the World Bank’s involvement was the establishment of an International 
Advisory Group (IAG). The Group's general mandate is to monitor compliance with all 
arrangements involved in the project. The Group visits the two countries every six 
months and its reports are published on the internet.  
 
As part of the World Bank’s accompanying measures the Fonds d'Actions Concertées 
d'Initiatives Locales (FACIL) had been set up. This decentralized development fund for 
the oil region, in which local civil society, too, was involved, was meant, among other 
things, to channel part of the oil revenue (5 percent of the revenue) back to the oil region. 
However, due to red tape and lack of ownership, the outcome of FACIL's work was 
disappointing. Today, FACIL is no longer in existence as the Chadian side explicitly 
stated that it no longer needed support in this regard, even though there are obvious 
capacity constraints. Furthermore, in view of its general poor budget situation, the 
government of Chad has requested the World Bank to agree to an amendment of the 
relevant law. Proposed amendments include increasing the share of oil revenue to be 
channeled into the general budget by 15 percent, to 30 percent, eliminating the fund for 
future generations, and broadening the definition of priority sectors. The government 
cites the high expectations of the people of Chad as a reason for the amendments. 
 
At the international level, the establishment of the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD) can serve as a historical model for such a solidarity-based 
contribution towards putting windfall profits to use for development. The Fund was 
created in 1976 by a joint decision of industrialized and OPEC countries. The balance-of-
payment surpluses of OPEC, which were enormous at the time, were to be combined with 
funds from industrialized countries to increase food production and enhance the nutrition 
status of rural people in the poorest countries of the world. IFAD is a specialized agency 
of the United Nations and is organized along the lines of a development bank. In this 
case, too, the experience gained over 30 years has certainly been mixed.  
 
In December 2005, the IMF has set up an Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) which 
provides policy support and financial assistance to low-income countries facing 
exogenous shocks, like from increasing oil prices. It is available to countries eligible for 
the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) but that do not have a PRGF program 
in place. Financing terms are equivalent to a PRGF arrangement and more concessional 
than under other IMF emergency lending facilities. 
 
 
Chapter V: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The goal of ensuring the sustainable, pro-development utilization of rentier economies 
through development cooperation can only be reached if the classic range of addressees, 
namely, oil-exporting developing countries, is broadened to include all those players who 
are responsible, both at the regional and at the international level, for determining the 
rules governing the national and international financial sector and national and 
international trade. However, in order to make progress in this field there is a need for   12 
 
 
political commitment across policy fields to mainstream this goal and achieve coherent 
action in international bodies, across individual ministries.  
 
This implies an approach based on concentric circles, starting by improving the general 
technical and political environment (management advice and promotion of good 
governance) at the national level, strengthening regulatory and monitoring capacity at the 
regional level (economic communities, African Union), and, at the international level, 
revising the set of standards that determine the overall framework (European Union, 
United Nations, International Financial Institutions). Each of these concentric circles is 
vital to success on the goal of achieving a higher share of funding being provided by the 
countries of sub-Saharan Africa themselves, but while each of them constitutes a 
necessary condition, only action on all of them will lead to success. The following points 
are thus very closely interrelated, and success on one hinges on success on the others and 
vice versa. 
 
V.1. Improving  Sustainable Oil Profit Management 
In all countries, the transparency and control of payment flows from extractive industry 
to the public sector are of central importance. So as a matter of priority, development 
cooperation should support EITI and PWYP. One focal area of services offered under 
development cooperation in this regard should be advice to policymakers (energy and 
transport ministries) with a view to the sustainable management of oil profits. In that 
way, development cooperation could help partner countries draw up the requisite 
legislation and build the necessary capacity for monitoring and controlling, thus 
contributing to the enhanced integration of the EITI approach into national reform 
processes. This would simultaneously foster the goal of strengthening the relevant 
governments with regard to their ability to negotiate with oil companies. The capacity 
gap in this field gives rise to a risk of highly unequal contracts to the detriment of oil-
exporting countries. In the case of Chad, it is estimated that a mere 12.5 percent of oil 
revenues goes to the state. This figure is far below international standards. Other projects 
of vital significance in this context involve advice on tax reform, budget preparation, 
expenditure planning, and auditing. 
 
V.2. Fostering  Good  Governance 
If it is to be ensured that the governments of the countries concerned discharge their 
responsibility, vast improvements with regard to good governance are needed within 
these countries. This means strengthening all levels of government, both with regard to 
the legislative and the executive branch; fostering decentralization; strengthening the 
rights of civil society; and reinforcing the fight against corruption. The overall goal of 
these measures is the creation of a political consensus, based on democratic principles, on 
the need for development. Without this good governance aspect, it will not be possible 
for the national government to prioritize, in a responsible manner, the development goals 
to be defined. 
 
In view of this political culture, which is developing very slowly, it is often not the 
absence of technical management capacity or of a suitable set of standards and 
regulations that is the problem but the application and implementation of such capacity   13 
 
 
and regulations at the political level by local elites. This means that technical cooperation 
projects providing advice on good governance will only be successful to the extent that 
they explicitly include market mechanisms that make it good sense for players, even from 
a purely economic-benefit point of view, to comply with good governance standards that 
are rooted in ethical considerations.  
 
V.3.  Enhancing International Standards and Guidelines 
Policymakers should actively work for the establishment of regulations for payment flow 
disclosure and appeal to the relevant institutions and organizations to take suitable 
initiatives. Relevant openings include the rules governing international capital 
transactions (e.g., considering the introduction of an International Financial Reporting 
Standard), the transparency guidelines for international stock exchanges, and the 
adjustment of ODA eligibility criteria in line with EITI. The goal of efforts should be to 
create a level playing field for all players involved which would make it formally 
impossible to have a race to the bottom for the lowest standards in the course of the 
implementation of concrete projects. Yet, any policy that seeks to achieve a breakthrough 
for the pro-development approach will have to take account of "pragmatic" geo-strategic 
interests.
4 This means that the development policy dialogue must not only be pursued 
with the African countries concerned but also, and particularly, with their trading 
partners. Hence, efforts need to be undertaken to enter into a dialogue with Asian 
countries in order to prevent them from undermining the joint efforts for fostering 
democracy, conflict prevention, and transparency. Without such a global perspective, all 
efforts will only be addressing the symptoms.  
 
V.4. Intensifying  Cooperation  with International Organizations 
The feasibility of activities under development cooperation also depends on whether 
there is any scope for official cooperation with a given oil-producing country. For 
example, except for the problematic case of Cameroon, none of the oil-exporting 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa are priority partner countries for German development 
policy. This is resulting in the paradoxical situation that no direct influence can be 
brought to bear precisely on those countries where the negative impacts of the oil boom 
are strongest. However, the existence of regional economic organizations and 
communities offers an opportunity to establish guidelines and quality standards across 
countries which would then also be applied in those countries to where bilateral 
development cooperation may not have immediate access because of these countries' 
status. Official development cooperation can also intervene if oil-producing countries 
have to comply with conditionalities imposed by the World Bank and/or the IMF, for 
example, due to high indebtedness. 
                                                 
4 For example, when the United States labeled Sudan a rogue state and forced all American oil companies 
to withdraw, China immediately took over. Sudan now ships 60 percent of its production to China. China is 
currently building a 1,500 km pipeline from the fields in southern Sudan to the Red Sea port of Port Sudan. 
China justifies its conduct by citing the respective partner countries' right to govern their internal affairs. 
With this type of pragmatism, the Chinese government is undermining all efforts to help root pro-
development action in Sudan as well as in an ever growing number of other resource-exporting African 
countries. China's growing dependence on the world's resource markets seems to leave it no choice. In 
2004, China imported 31.3 percent more oil than in the previous year and thus became the third largest 





V.5.   African Oil Fund 
The additional costs arising to oil-importing developing countries as a result of the rising 
prices of the past few years have now reached a level that is higher than total 
international official development assistance. This means that generally speaking, the 
impact of factors that impede development is now probably greater than that of factors 
that are conducive to development. This might easily result in further economic 
destabilization and in a considerable increase in the potential for political conflict. Oil-
exporting countries cannot be interested in such an exacerbation of risks resulting from 
increasing regional disparity. So it should be in the enlightened self-interest of oil-
producing countries to share their wealth with their "poor" neighbors through a regional 
solidarity or equalization mechanism, especially as many African oil-exporting countries 
are expected to soon reach the limit of their absorptive capacity for investments.
5 In order 
to capture such funds and put them to use for development, players should therefore 
actively call for, and support, not only the establishment of national funds but also, in 
particular, the idea of multi-country oil funds with a view to spreading the financial 
benefits and making a solidarity-based contribution to equitable regional development. 
 
While oil-exporting countries have been asked to contribute to the IMF’s External Shock 
Facility, it is unlikely that many African oil-exporting countries will contribute to such a 
global fund. Hence, another attempt should be made to tie up the windfall profits 
accruing in the Africa, and especially in the Gulf of Guinea, via an African fund that 
would make them available to the entire region and/or to future generations. This would 
visibly strengthen cooperation in the region, decrease resource-based development 
disparity, and reduce the potential for conflicts between countries. However, if such oil 
funds are to function properly, there is a need not only for the oil countries to be 
politically willing to shoulder more regional responsibility but also for the fund to be 
managed in a professional manner that is largely free from vested interests. With a view 
to African ownership, the inclusion of the African Development Bank should therefore be 
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